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Donald Wayne Viney 
 
 
 C. S. Peirce (1839-1914), the great American philosopher and logician, complained that 
the writers of logic books in his day were “men of arrested brain-development” and that they 
were with rare exceptions, “shambling reasoners.” Judging from Douglas Walton’s analysis of 
treatments of ad hominem arguments in logic textbooks, Peirce would have little reason to 
change his judgment. Walton’s survey of logic texts (especially in chapter 2), reveals a variety of 
conflicting accounts of the nature of ad hominem arguments. 
 
 Walton’s own careful categorization and formalization of the various kinds of ad 
hominem arguments brings clarity to the subject. According to Walton, the generic form of ad 
hominem argument is: P is a bad person; therefore, P’s argument A should not be accepted (113). 
The author identifies three basic subtypes of this generic form, each of which gives a different 
reason for the premise that P is a bad person: direct (which questions P’s character), 
circumstantial (which alleges an inconsistency between A’s conclusion and P’s real 
commitments), and bias (which identifies extra-logical motives for why P defends A’s 
conclusion). Other well-known versions of ad hominem argument—for example, guilt by 
association, the two wrongs fallacy, tu quoque, and poisoning the well—are classified as 
specialized versions of the three basic subtypes (see Figures 6.2, 261). 
 
 While some logic texts define ad hominem arguments as fallacious, others recognize 
exceptions on the grounds that, in a court of law, a witness’ character is directly relevant to 
whether his or her testimony is judged reliable. Walton takes this idea a step further and defends 
the thesis that no ad hominem argument is inherently fallacious but that it is good or bad 
depending on the argumentative context. He emphasizes that ad hominem arguments are 
“inherently weak and fragile forms of argument” (231), however, they can be warranted when 
morals and politics are at issue. If Bertrand Russell gives advice on how we should manage our 
lives it is reasonable, says Walton, to ask how Russell managed his personal affairs (121). 
 
 Chapter 4 provides a detailed analysis of an actual debate over a certain politician who 
argued against tax loopholes while using them for his own benefit. The debate concerned the 
consistency of the politician’s position, his hypocrisy, and the credibility of the party that 
supported him despite his behavior. Walton believes that his analysis of the debate illustrates the 
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kinds of moves that can be made in such a controversy and the ways in which character can play 
an important role in political debates.     
 
 The most troubling aspect of Walton’s case is that he never adequately distinguishes 
between attacking a person’s argument and attacking a person’s testimony. This is most evident 
in his discussion of the credibility function. Walton believes that ad hominem argumentation can 
best be modeled by assigning to participants in the argument a credibility function that raises or 
lowers the plausibility value—Walton does not say probability—of “the proposition (or the 
argument) advocated by the person in a dialogue” (237). Note that, for Walton, the credibility 
function may affect either a proposition or an argument. It is understandable that a person’s 
credibility could affect the plausibility value of his or her testimony (which is a proposition, or 
series of propositions claimed to be true). What is not clear is how the person’s credibility could 
affect the arguments he or she proposes. This seems no less true in the realm of morals and 
politics than in the realm of science. It would be as absurd to discount Isaac Newton’s arguments 
about gravity on the grounds that he was a scoundrel as it would be to dismiss Simone de 
Beauvoir’s argument against marriage on the grounds that she had lesbian affairs. Testimony, on 
the other hand, may be believed or disbelieved based on the trustworthiness of the one testifying, 
especially on matters of which we have no other means of knowing. If a person’s testimony 
plays the role of a premise in an argument, then the person’s character is relevant to whether we 
accept the premise as true. In this case, however, questioning the person’s character no longer 
fits the generic ad hominem argument schema. 
 
 It is a fair question whether, keeping clearly in mind the distinction between criticism of 
an argument and criticism of testimony, there is a single example of ad hominem argument in 
Walton’s book that could classify even as a “weak and fragile presumptive form of argument.” 
Despite this weakness, Walton’s book can be recommended for its plethora of interesting 
examples, its historically informed discussion, and its useful typology of ad hominem arguments.      
